CARTESIAN VS THOMISTIC DUALISM

I. Need for Deeper Concept of Substance Dualism

A. View so far only presents us with a substantial mind, its relationship to the body unspecified

B. Thomistic vs Cartesian Dualism (though labels not used exactly)

C. Two mistakes in Cartesian Dualism
   1. Soul = Mind; thus, Mind/Body problem rather than Soul/Body problem
   2. Body = physical machine – what, then, makes the body human? Relationship between mind and body one of external causality

D. Thomistic view
   1. Soul is form of the body, completely diffused in completely throughout body, thus body is human
   2. Relationship of soul to body is formal, not only efficiently causal
   3. The soul can exist without the body; the body cannot exist without the soul

II. Clarification and Defense of Thomistic Dualism

A. States and Faculties of the Soul
   1. States in the Soul: sensations, thoughts, beliefs, acts, desires
   2. Faculties of the Soul
      a. Always present even if not actualized
      b. Hierarchical (1st vs 2nd order, etc.) – lower order must be actualized before higher order (and ultimate) can be actualized
      c. Grouped into faculties (“compartments” of the soul that contain related capacities)

B. The Soul and the Body
   1. Soul is active principle of the body (form/matter) – changes activated according to law or information of the essence
   2. Essence limits kinds of change possible and still be same substance
   3. Upon coming into existence, the soul (given the right circumstances) begins to produce the body – body reflects internal relations in the soul (but remember simplicity of the soul!)
   4. Implications:
      a. Organism as a whole is ontologically prior to its parts
      b. Parts of the organism’s body stand in internal relations to other parts and to the soul’s essence
c. Body is developed and grows in a teleological way as a series of developmental events that occur in a lawlike way, rooted in the eternal essence of the human soul
d. Soul is efficient cause of characteristics of human body

C. Assessing the views: Two Arguments in Favor of Thomistic Dualism
   1. Apparent internal relations of macrolevel body parts
      a. Body parts (e.g., the heart) have proper, normative functions. Hearts pump blood. Cf. naturalism, in which hearts are the kind of things that normally pump blood. POF: Hard to do biology without teleological language!
      b. Thought experiment: modified humans in which heart does not need to pump blood but may then be used for other purposes—still seems to be true that the heart ought to pump blood.

   2. Relation of DNA/genes to body
      a. Genocentrism – genes are the fundamental units of life; the body exists to pass on genes; most popular view
      b. Organocentrism – living organisms qua irreducible wholes fundamental units of life; DNA functions as blueprint, genes as produce cell material; neither (even taken together) are life itself
      c. Evidence for organocentrism – DNA/Gene replication both presupposes and only works within the context of a larger, whole unit

III. Two Further Objections to Thomistic Substance Dualism
   A. On TSD, ff humans have souls, so do animals; but Scripture does not teach that animals have souls; therefore, TSD is wrong
      1. Scripture does teach that animals have souls (cf. Gen 1:30)
      2. Different kinds of souls relative to their faculties (vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls)

   B. TSD = biological vitalism, which has been rejected by modern biologists
      1. Rejection to a priori acceptance of naturalism (question begging)
      2. TSD based on prior metaphysical questions and is not in conflict with any empirical biological statements
      3. TSD actually consistent with and helps explain much modern biology

IV. The Origin of the Soul in Normal and Abnormal Cases
   A. Normal Origins
      1. Creationism – each soul created directly by God
         a. Cartesian: God creates the soul at some point after conception and connects it to a body being naturally generated
b. Thomistic: When conditions to create a new body obtain, God creates the soul and infuses it into the physical entities constituting those conditions, causing them to undergo a substantial change, thus making the body human (note: Moreland assumes Platonic view of properties here; see p. 220)

2. Traducianism – each soul generated in procreation
   a. Multiple versions, not all valid (e.g., Tertullian)
   b. Conditions to create new body are not merely physical; egg and sperm have soulish potentialities; union of egg and sperm produce new substance

B. Abnormal Origins
   1. Nuclear transplant cloning – No a priori knowledge of what constitutes conditions by which a soul is created; lit., egg and sperm are not potential souls. They are the kinds of things that (normally) provide the material for the production of souls. Whether or not the same possibility applies to other materials is open to Thomistic Traducianism.
   2. Frozen embryos – The soul can exist with dormant, non-functioning capacities
   3. Twinning/Cloning – We discover by brute fact that some substances can be cloned/twinned (e.g., starfish). Not impossible to believe, given soul's non-extension and simplicity.

V. Ethical Implications of Thomistic Substance Dualism
   A. Potential persons and human nonpersons – for Thomists, genus and species not degreed categories, hence no such thing as potential people or human nonpersons
   B. Loss of capacities – for Thomists, capacities are not lost; only ability to exemplify capacities are lost
   C. Criteria for death – in whole vs. higher brain death, Thomists prefer the former (BUT SEE HENDERSON!)